The assessment identifies three principal strengths: an institutionalised exit route, the complementary capacities of 17 government institutions, and a structured rehabilitation curriculum. Participantsparticularly valued psychological care, religious engagement and vocational training. The programme combines military coordination and protection with  specialist rehabilitation and assigns responsibility for reintegration to state governments. In May 2026, the coordinator reported that more than 3,000 participants had been reintegrated during its first decade.1 Sustained civilian life beyond the camp remains the more demanding test of its effectiveness.

The principal weaknesses stem from the uneven fulfilment of shared institutional responsibilities. Defence Headquarters carries a disproportionate operational and financial burden, supplemented by development partners. Contributions from participating agencies are insufficiently institutionalised and can depend on the commitment of individual officeholders. Funding constraints, staff shortages and weak state ownership outside Borno limit care and support after graduation. Fragmented follow up and inadequate livelihood and family assistance compound these difficulties. Limited community participation in investigations and access to court proceedings also weaken confidence in the legal
decisions preceding return. Despite expanded public engagement, persistent misinformation  about recruitment, legal review, financial benefits and renewed violence continues to undermine trust. Conflation with other exit arrangements and the risk of identity-based hostility add to this challenge.