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The February 2025 West Africa Security Tracker documents a persistently volatile security landscape across the region, with 845 incidents leading to 1,678 fatalities, a 27.8% decrease from January. Despite this decline, the threat posed by insurgencies, communal violence, and criminal networks remains deeply entrenched.

The year 2023 in Nigeria was marked by a series of elections. In February, there were presidential and legislative elections, followed by gubernatorial contests in March, supplementary contests in April, and three off-cycle governorship elections in November. These electoral events were influenced by various factors, ranging from identity politics to the challenges faced by electoral and security institutions. In the aftermath of the fiercely contested elections, both local and foreign stakeholders remain concerned about the country’s security and political landscape. The challenges anticipated for the new administration are considerable, and this report aims to shed light on the intricate interplay between insecurity and electoral processes, providing insights for stakeholders to navigate the complex issues at hand. Security challenges are pervasive across the entire country. In the North-Central, conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over resources have been prominent. In the South-South zone, persistent oil-related militancy remains a significant concern. Secessionist movements in the South-East continue to cause challenges to the state, while the North-West and North-East have continued to grapple with militant jihadist groups and the proliferation of communal militias and other non-state armed groups. Finally, the South-West has witnessed increased clashes between the regional community militia and other groups, ranging from pastoralists to other security outfits. Despite former President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration (2015 – 2023) having been elected largely on the promise of addressing insecurity, these challenges persist under his successor. In ensuring Nigeria’s peace and stability, this report identifies three emerging post-election challenges that underscore the critical need to address the drivers of political violence, indicative of state-society relations and their impact on elections. First, in response to security and legitimacy concerns in the lead-up to and the immediate aftermath of the 2023 elections, the Nigerian government must prioritise addressing concerns related to marginalisation and identity. These concerns have been prominent factors contributing to electoral violence observed in all four elections this year, posing a substantial risk of further unrest. Second, considering the enduring influence and political power wielded by incumbent leaders, it is imperative for the Nigerian government to adopt a comprehensive strategy to address and mitigate the risks associated with the abuse of power manifested in leaders’ involvement in politics. Finally, the government must address citizens’ concerns that politicians exploit judicial actions to secure office through the courts, which has continued to exacerbate conflict, especially in areas where elections are keenly contested.

The Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi off-cycle elections are scheduled to take place on November 11, 2023. Off-cycle elections are held outside the general elections schedule due to circumstances such as death, resignation, impeachment, annulment of elections by courts, and many more. The forthcoming off-cycle elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi, which are scheduled to take place in the aftermath of the 2023 Nigerian general elections, hold a pivotal place in the country’s democratic process. These elections provide a unique opportunity for a swift evaluation of the new government’s performance so far and offer a referendum on how citizens in these states respond to the leadership of the recently elected administration. The outcomes of these contests will significantly impact the political fortunes of the parties involved and lay the foundation for the upcoming general elections in 2027. The 2023 Nigerian general elections marked an important milestone in the country’s democratic journey, characterized by technological advancements, increased civil society participation, and identity-based divisions among candidates and parties. These factors influenced the election results and set the stage for the off-cycle governorship elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi.

Cryptocurrency as a digital asset is designed to work as a medium of exchange that uses cryptography to anonymously secure its transactions, control the creation of additional units and to verify the transfer of assets.

Across the region, hard-won progress in press freedom and civil liberties are in decline with journalists arbitrarily detained and disinformation is on the rise. Addressing these challenges in the context of economic stagnation will be a significant challenge.

Civic awareness of the continuous voter’s registration process and the importance of participating has largely been driven by a sustained online campaign in the run-up to 2023, while the platforms can be used to fact check and hold elected and aspiring officials to account. Finding a balance that accentuates these positives and diminishes the negative aspects must be a priority as the elections approach.

The 2023 elections will likely be the first to feel the significant impact of a third major increase in the country’s registered voter population. Whereas in previous elections increase in the registered voter population did not typically translate into a higher voter turnout, as was the case in 2019. In fact, the percentage of voter turn-out dropped with every successive election since the 2003 electoral cycle. Despite this trend, there is cause for optimism that it will be reversed in the 2023 elections. This is because significant campaigns have been launched to encourage younger voters to register and get their permanent voter card (PVC) in order to become more active stakeholders in the electoral process. Another reason is increased faith in the electoral process following the introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation Software (BVAS) and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Results Viewing Portal (IReV). The development led to an increase in the number of youths registered to vote – the electoral body estimates 40% of newly registered voters are students3 – making it the strata with the highest number of potential voters. In looking at the 2023 elections, it is important to look at critical trends we can identify from past elections and assess their salience, alongside

Over the last few months, whether in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, or elsewhere, Africans, the youth in particular, have, in their thousands, frequently and stridently protested French policies in Africa. This is striking when compared to the attitudes of previous generations. This unmistakable intensification of the rancor against France’s policies in Francophone countries’ populace and political and intellectual classes alike seems to have now reached most of the rest of Africa’s elites.

The spread of falsehoods across information ecosystems in West Africa is growing. Although enabled by increasing access to social media and the internet across the region, the flow of fake news is not simply confined to online spaces but moves between offline and digital environments with regularity and ease.

The Nigerian body politic faces a seeming epidemic of insecurity spanning jihadist insurgency, criminal banditry, farmer-herder conflicts, and violent separatist agitations. While governmental responses have overwhelming followed a militarised path to resolving these multifaceted conflicts, such interventions do not appear to have substantially diminished insecurity.

Fake news is a phenomenon that does not spare Togo, like other countries in the world. It is therefore important to try to understand the mechanisms that govern their rapid dissemination in order to find ways of mitigation.

As is the case in other countries, false information is now an integral part of the information flow ecosystem in Burkina Faso. This false information rubs shoulders with true information in a context marked by the development of digital social networks and the internet in general.

The spread of false news or infox, known as ''fake news'' in the Anglo-Saxon world, has taken on a worrying and devastating scale in Benin over the last decade. The surge in the circulation of fake news has coincided with the increase in internet penetration, the growth of mobile internet and the emergence of social networks.

his study, which draws on 16 key informant interviews with academics, journalists, lawyers and social media users and an extensive review of relevant reports, documents and social media posts, provides one of the first comprehensive overviews of the, increasingly digital, information eco-system in Cabo Verde.

As is the case in several countries, false information is gaining ground in the public space in Senegal. The phenomenon itself is not new, but it is now accentuated and popularised with the advent of social networks and other digital platforms.

Misinformation involves the spread of falsehoods without a deliberate attempt to mislead whilst disinformation is manipulated narrative or facts— propaganda deliberately intended to mislead. Both occur in Guinea-Bissau, with the recent Covid-19 pandemic bringing significant attention to the use of social media platforms and messaging applications for that end. T

Fake news is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. Historically, peddlers of disinformation were popularly referred to as “radio without battery”, with fake news a weapon in Nigeria’s civil war (1967- 1970). Today in Nigeria’s southeast, fake news peddlers are given the moniker of ‘Okokon Dems’

This report explores Ghana’s fake news ecosystem examining key actors in the online and offline space and the origins of their authority; key online information platforms and the interaction between offline media and non-media structures that shape information flows and gender dynamics.

Niger’s first private media entities emerged in the 1990s following the fall of the single party and military era. However, the birth of private media did not lead to a free and independent media. A bipolar media system quickly took shape, with public media tending to support the ruling party and private media siding with the opposition.

This study aims to better understand key facets of the ecosystem of fake news in Mali. It argues that the deteriorated political context in the country has facilitated the proliferation of fake news. The Malian fake news ecosystem is also thriving in the traditional media which is dominated by the political and economic elite who sponsor narratives to serve their own ends.