What Operation Safe Corridor Can Learn from Nigeria’s Colonial Leprosy Program
The move from the previous kinetic “search and destroy” tactic to a more intricate non-kinetic tactic employed by the Nigerian government marks an intellectual transition in the long war against the Boko Haram terrorist movement. Whereas the intellectual development of Nigeria’s “softer” strategy against terrorism can be traced back to the pre-Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) era, the launch of OSC in 2016 became the most visible aspect of this idea. In principle, OSC is a very sophisticated strategy aimed at rehabilitating extremists into society; However, Safe Corridor can learn from the Lazaretto Framework to improve its impact.
The Colonial Parallel: The Utilitarian Trap
The British colonial authorities and the Christian missionaries established the Lazaretto facilities in Northern Nigeria to address the leprosy plague through the clinical segregation of patients and the provision of the 'dole,' a consistent rationing of food and clothes to prevent patients from going around the town begging for money. It is important to note that during this period, there was no permanent cure for leprosy until the discovery of dapsone in the 1940s; consequently, treatments were largely experimental. While these early medical interventions could eventually lead to healing, the process was incredibly slow. The patients became unsure about whether a cure was possible, but sure that there was "the dole." The result was that many of the patients did not follow the clinical objectives because they made use of the institution "as a transactional nexus," taking on the "compliant ward role," only when the dole continued.
The similarities between the colonial 'leper' and the contemporary 'repentant' insurgent are rooted in the structural mechanism of the 'utilitarian trap.' However, the nature of these transactions differs significantly based on prevailing power dynamics. While the colonial 'dole' offered material sustenance in exchange for isolation, the modern Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) program functions as a form of bureaucratic theatre. Here, the state maintains the agency to classify an individual as 'low risk,' effectively gatekeeping the ultimate reward: physical freedom. The participant, in turn, performs the role of the 'repentant,' utilising the state's rehabilitation narrative as a vehicle to secure release from the immediate, life-threatening environment of military detention. To avoid repeating the failures of its colonial predecessors, the government must recognise that a genuine 'cure' cannot be engineered through the granting of freedom alone; it requires addressing the deep-seated socio-political drivers of insurgency, such as early-life narcotics involvement and structural alienation.
The Black Box: Risk Classification at Giwa Barracks
The process that leads to Operation Safe Corridor begins with the surrender or capture of suspected Boko Haram members. They are typically transferred to Giwa Barracks, where they are classified into low, medium, and high risk categories. This classification process is led by the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with Nigerian security agencies. Only those assessed as low risk are transferred to Operation Safe Corridor’s Mallam Sidi camp.
Individuals classified as low risk include those who were forcibly abducted and exploited, civilians wrongfully accused of terrorism due to their proximity to conflict zones, and local economic actors such as farmers, herders, and fishermen who were effectively trapped in insurgent-controlled territories. Before their transfer to the Mallam Sidi camp, many of the low-risk defectors spend months or even years in military detention facilities, often treated with the same suspicion as those who actively took up arms.
A key challenge is that even after being assessed as largely innocent and classified as low risk, their release is delayed by the administrative requirements of Operation Safe Corridor and by institutional capacity constraints. The camp and its personnel can only accommodate a limited number of individuals at a time. More critically, their release is tied to the provision of “starter packs.” Operation Safe Corridor sources these starter packs from government agencies and development partners, and only those for whom such support is available are included in each transfer batch. As a result, access to freedom becomes contingent on the availability of these starter packs, even though freedom should not be conditional in this way. Although not empirically substantiated, such a system could create incentives for individuals to compete for inclusion in subsequent batches or foster opportunities for corruption, where those with connections to officials are more likely to be selected.
Strengthening the Corridor
To prevent Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) from becoming a perpetual “lazaretto”—a holding ground for individuals seeking escape from the systemic risks of military detention—the programme must evolve into a robust, evidence-based rehabilitation pipeline.
First, the counterterrorism prosecution process must be strengthened so that investigations are timely and justice is delivered efficiently. Those found guilty should be prosecuted without delay, while individuals classified as low risk should be further stratified. This would allow those who do not require rehabilitation to be released directly, rather than waiting in batches for admission into OSC as a pathway to freedom. Where state capacity is limited, the Nigerian government can collaborate with private intelligence firms and engage criminologists, mental health professionals, and community stakeholders to support independent vetting and assessment processes.
Second, the intake capacity of OSC must be significantly expanded. At present, the programme is funded primarily by the Defence Headquarters and development partners such as the Centre for Democracy and Development, despite being designed as a whole-of-government initiative involving 17 ministries, departments, and agencies. This funding structure has constrained its operational capacity. Operation Safe Corridor lacks a dedicated secretariat and has operated in an ad hoc manner for over a decade, without a clear legislative framework from the National Assembly to underpin its mandate. For OSC to function as an effective deradicalisation and reintegration programme, it must be standardised and adequately supported through sustained financing, increased manpower, and the deployment of modern deradicalisation technologies.
Moreover, the success of OSC cannot remain confined to the physical boundaries of the camp. The transition to civilian life is the stage at which reintegration efforts most often fail. To address this gap, Local Government Areas (LGAs) should be empowered to function as extensions of OSC by establishing localised, long-term monitoring and support systems. This includes creating community-based structures that provide continuous counselling, vocational mentorship, and regular drug screening. Shifting the focus from the camp to the community transforms reintegration from a temporary intervention into a sustained, localised support framework. In doing so, physical release becomes not the endpoint of detention, but the beginning of meaningful social reintegration, thereby reducing the risks of recidivism and re-recruitment.
Beyond the OSC framework, the state must adopt a more intensive, clinically supervised model of addiction treatment and trauma-informed care for populations in conflict-affected areas. Early exposure to narcotics and unresolved trauma are recurrent drivers of insurgent recruitment, and these factors must be prioritised within the rehabilitation pipeline. Material grants, often used as indicators of programme success, are insufficient to address the deep psychological impacts of conflict. Replacing such short-term incentives with sustained mental health support and structured addiction treatment would enable the government to address the underlying conditions that predispose individuals to insurgent involvement.
Author's BIo
Dr. Itodo Unekwu Friday is a scholar in the Department of History and International Studies at Prince Abubakar Audu University, Anyigba, specialising in humanitarian studies, medical diplomacy and public health history. His research explores the intersection of colonial health policies and indigenous knowledge systems in West Africa. He can be reached via email at ugbedeitodo@gmail.com