Guinea’s 2025 Election: Democratic Milestone or Autocratic Mask?
Guinea’s first presidential election since a 2021 military coup took place on December 28, 2025, amid both official fanfare and deep scepticism. The junta bills the vote as a triumphant return to constitutional order, but critics contend it merely legitimises a coup leader’s grip on power. General Mamady Doumbouya, who seized power four years ago, ran virtually unopposed and is widely expected to secure a seven-year term -raising the question: Is this election a new dawn for Guinea’s democracy or just an autocratic regime donning civilian clothes?
From Coup to Constitution: A Brief History
The backdrop to this election is set against Guinea’s recent turbulent history. In September 2021, then-Colonel Mamady Doumbouya led a military coup that ousted President Alpha Condé, ending a decade of civilian rule. Condé, once hailed as “Guinea’s Mandela” for being the country’s first freely elected president in 2010, had steadily drifted into authoritarianism. After two terms in office, Condé pushed through a controversial new constitution in March 2020 to reset term limits in order to allow himself a third term. This move sparked widespread protests that were met with violent repression – dozens of people were killed in clashes with security forces, and opposition leaders were jailed. Undeterred, Condé held an election in October 2020 amid the turmoil, officially “winning” a third term as at least 30 more people died in election-related unrest.
For many Guineans, Condé’s power grab was the final straw. Alioune Tine, a prominent African human rights expert, observed that Condé’s refusal to step down made “either a popular uprising or a coup inevitable”, noting that the veteran leader had “put people in prison… killed and completely refused any political dialogue with the opposition.” Indeed, on September 5, 2021, Doumbouya – a special forces commander Condé himself had appointed – led soldiers into the presidential palace and removed the 83-year-old Condé from power. Jubilant crowds in Conakry welcomed the coup, seeing it as liberation from Condé’s increasingly autocratic rule.
Doumbouya justified the coup as a response to poverty and endemic corruption under Condé. He dissolved the government and vowed to end the chaos and return the country to democratic rule. In the coup’s aftermath, the new junta established a transitional charter, initially barring its members from future elections and promising a short transition. Guinea’s West African neighbours, through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), immediately condemned the coup and suspended Guinea from the bloc. ECOWAS imposed sanctions and pressed for a swift timetable to restore civilian governance.
ECOWAS: Sanctions, Deadlines, and Election Monitors
ECOWAS’s engagement has been pivotal from the coup to the 2025 election. Under threat of regional isolation, Doumbouya’s regime initially proposed a 36-month transition to civilian rule, which ECOWAS rejected as being too long. After negotiations, the junta grudgingly agreed to a 24-month timeline starting in January 2023 – theoretically committing to elections by early 2025. In practice, however, deadlines slipped. The junta missed at least two promised dates for elections, eventually scheduling the vote for the end of 2025.
Notably, ECOWAS avoided a full confrontation with Doumbouya despite the delays. Unlike Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – neighbouring coup-born regimes that openly defied ECOWAS and even quit the bloc – Guinea under Doumbouya maintained dialogue and stayed within ECOWAS’s fold. This pragmatic stance went both ways: Doumbouya kept Guinea engaged with ECOWAS, and in turn, ECOWAS refrained from overly harsh measures, wary of pushing Guinea into the camp of anti-ECOWAS military regimes. By 2025, ECOWAS had lifted some sanctions and sent an observer mission to monitor Guinea’s “return to civilian rule” vote.
ECOWAS’s election observation mission was on the ground for the December 28 polls. In its preliminary assessment, the ECOWAS team noted that election day proceeded calmly with no major security incidents – a significant achievement in a country with a history of electoral violence. However, international observers and opposition groups alike questioned the credibility of the vote, given the absence of key challengers and a repressive pre-election environment, including the restriction of social media.
An Election Without Real Opposition
From the outset, Guinea’s 2025 election was stacked in favour of the junta leader. General Doumbouya swapped his military fatigues for civilian white robes to run for president, but few doubted the outcome. He faced eight little-known candidates with no strong political base. All major opposition figures were absent from the ballot. Ousted ex-President Alpha Condé and longtime opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo both remain in exile and were barred from running – Diallo was sidelined by a junta-launched corruption case and a residency requirement in the new constitution, while authorities dissolved Condé’s party. In August 2025, the military government suspended the three largest opposition parties, including Condé’s RPG and Diallo’s UFDG, on technical pretexts, effectively decapitating the opposition ahead of the vote. Another prominent figure, former Prime Minister Sidya Touré, was similarly disqualified due to living in exile.
The political climate under Doumbouya made genuine debate next to impossible. Over the past two years, his government has banned protests, muzzled independent media, and targeted critics with arrests. Just a week before the election, authorities even blocked access to Facebook, Tiktok and other social media nationwide, cutting off a key platform for dissent. The junta tightly controlled the campaign: Doumbouya himself made few appearances, letting state media and ministers trumpet his achievements (like new infrastructure projects and mining deals), while denying opposition voices any comparable platform. State TV hosted a series of candidate debates, but without any heavyweight rivals present, these were largely token affairs.
Opposition activists denounced the entire process as a sham. Diallo, the exiled leader of the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), condemned the election as “an electoral charade” aimed at rubber-stamping the planned confiscation of power by the junta. Several opposition parties and civil society groups, including the influential National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC), urged Guineans to boycott the vote rather than give it legitimacy.
Election Day: Peaceful Polls, Questionable Turnout
Election day itself unfolded in a largely peaceful and orderly fashion – a notable change in a country where past votes often descended into street clashes. No major incidents of violence were reported during polling hours. Over 23,000 polling stations operated under heavy security; armoured vehicles patrolled the capital, and the head of the gendarmerie ordered forces to maintain a high level of vigilance until results were finalised. The military regime was determined to prevent any disruption. On the eve of the vote, it claimed to have neutralised an armed group in a Conakry suburb that was allegedly plotting subversive acts.
When polls closed, the biggest controversy was not security, but turnout. The junta-appointed Electoral Commission (operating under the Ministry of Territorial Administration rather than as an independent body) announced a high participation rate of 85% of the 6.8 million registered voters. This figure, if accurate, would signal enthusiastic popular endorsement of the transition. However, it was immediately challenged by civil society. The FNDC countered that an overwhelming majority of Guineans chose to boycott this electoral charade, arguing that official numbers were wildly inflated. Reuters journalists observed “tepid” turnout in parts of Conakry, where many saw the election as a done deal. Some polling stations in the capital reportedly stayed quiet for hours. “I’m pragmatic – I voted for continuity,” one voter told reporters, while others simply stayed home.
As preliminary results trickled in, they reflected the one-sided nature of the contest. Early tallies from Conakry and other regions showed Doumbouya winning over 80% of the vote in many localities. By two days after the vote, partial official results gave the junta leader a commanding lead nationwide – virtually assuring him of a first-round victory. With opposition parties crippled, this outcome was never in doubt. Two of the trailing candidates, Abdoulaye Yéro Baldé and Faya Millimono, lodged complaints of serious irregularities, alleging that their poll agents were barred from vote-counting centres and that ballot boxes were stuffed in some districts.
Democracy Restored or Autocracy Reinvented?
The 2025 Guinean presidential election leaves analysts and citizens divided over its significance. On one hand, it formally ends the military-led transition – Doumbouya will remove his uniform and presumably govern as a civilian president, and Guinea will have a constitutional government in place. The fact that an election was held at all (with campaigning, debates, and observers) differentiates Guinea’s path from those of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, where juntas have delayed or dispensed with elections. Doumbouya’s supporters argue that he has a popular mandate now, pointing to state-led projects and a promise to modernise Guinea. Indeed, some young voters credit him for bringing in fresh leadership and sidelining the old political class, hoping he will use his new legitimacy to fight corruption and develop the country.
On the other hand, seasoned Guinea-watchers see a continuation of authoritarian rule by other means. As West Africa analyst Gilles Yabi observed, Guinea under Doumbouya has simply “reverted to what it has essentially known since independence in 1958: authoritarian regimes, whether civilian or military”. All three of Guinea’s past presidents (Sékou Touré, Lansana Conté, and Alpha Condé) entrenched themselves in power, and Doumbouya appears to be following that well-trodden path – this time through the ballot rather than brute force. The new 2025 constitution he orchestrated actually expanded presidential power, extending the term from five to seven years and creating a Senate with many appointed members. Crucially, it abolished the clause that would have kept junta members from running, paving the way for Doumbouya’s candidacy. In effect, Doumbouya rewrote the rules to secure his own position – an irony not lost on Guineans, since these are the very tactics Condé used to justify a third term. The absence of a viable opposition in the new era raises doubts about any real checks and balances. Western governments, for their part, have largely muted their criticism, perhaps swayed by Guinea’s strategic mineral wealth. Doumbouya’s regime has kept global mining projects (like the giant Simandou iron ore mine) on track and courted foreign investors, which may incline external partners to accept this “democratic” façade in the name of stability.
Whether Guinea’s 2025 election is viewed as a democratic milestone or an autocratic mask depends on the perspective. For the junta and its supporters, it marks the successful completion of a transition and the dawn of a “Fourth Republic” under a visionary young leader. For the opposition and many civil society voices, it was a predetermined coronation that “does not allow for a free choice among voters” and merely sanctifies one-man rule through law.
However, for ECOWAS, despite the irregularities, this represents a strategic win and an opportunity to engage the Guinean government in rebuilding eroded democratic institutions. It also offers a chance to demonstrate a credible pathway for democratic transition and to signal that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger can pursue similar routes back to constitutional order. At the same time, this remains a delicate moment: if this new democratic experiment fails, ECOWAS risks renewed criticism for legitimising autocratic rule through electoral processes.