China’s Expanding Economic Footprint and its Implications for Peace, Security and Governance in the ECOWAS Region.

Introduction

As the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) marked its 50th anniversary in May 2025, the bloc stands at a critical juncture. Once celebrated as a model Regional Economic Community (REC), ECOWAS now grapples with unprecedented challenges. The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) in July 2024 has dealt a historic blow to regional integration, further complicating the region’s economic, political and security landscape.

Against this backdrop, China’s expanding economic influence has become a defining factor in shaping the region’s future, presenting both opportunities and significant risks for peace, security and governance. This article interrogates whether China’s expanding economic engagements are contributing to long-term regional stability, or whether they risk reinforcing fragile political systems and weakening ECOWAS’s ability to promote democratic governance and collective security. It further examines the implications of China’s longstanding policy of non-interference in the ECOWAS region; a principle that offers states greater autonomy and access to development finance without political conditions. While this approach is often welcomed by governments facing external scrutiny, it can have unintended consequences for governance, peace, and stability in the region. By continuing to engage economically with regimes under regional sanctions, China may inadvertently undermine ECOWAS’ efforts to enforce democratic norms, restore constitutional order and maintain regional stability. 

China-ECOWAS Economic Engagements: A Double-Edged Sword

Over the past two decades, China has solidified its position as ECOWAS’ largest economic partner, with its engagements encompassing trade, investment, and project financing, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has primarily driven infrastructure-related projects financing in the region. From Nigeria’s Lekki Deep-Sea Port financed by the China Harbour Engineering Company and Ghana’s Bui Dam co-funded by the China Exim Bank to Senegal’s Ila Touba expressway constructed by the China Road and Bridge Corporation, Benin’s railway networks and the new ECOWAS Commission Headquarters set for completion in 2025, China’s presence in the region is unmistakable. While these projects have spurred economic growth and development in the ECOWAS region, they have also raised critical questions about political autonomy, governance, peace and security as well as stability within the region.

China’s Non-Interference Dilemma: A Lifeline for Military Regimes?

A central concern is China’s ‘non-interference policy’, which posits that China does not seek to influence internal governance of countries, nor does it demand reforms in return for its support. While this approach offers financial flexibility to partner countries, it has also indirectly emboldened military regimes that face international scrutiny over unconstitutional power grabs. The recent wave of military coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger underscores this dilemma.

China’s continued economic engagements with these regimes have, in some instances, helped them circumvent ECOWAS and African Union (AU)-backed sanctions, providing economic lifelines while undermining regional efforts to uphold democratic governance mechanisms. For example, in April 2024, Niger’s military junta has signed a US$400 million deal with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) as part of its plan to “diversify international partnerships” after cutting ties with France and the United States. The deal would ultimately help Niger’s military junta meet short-term obligations as the economy struggles to recover from the impact of ECOWAS sanctions. Similarly, China has also backed a $130 million lithium and uranium exploration initiative in Kidal and Falea, further signaling its strategic interest in Mali’s natural resource corridors. 

Moreover, under junta-led governments, insecurity has worsened in the region although increased insecurity cannot be solely or directly attributed to China’s engagements with these States, particularly through its non-interference policy. The argument, however, is not that China causes violence per se, but rather that its approach inadvertently facilitates the survival and entrenchment of illegitimate regimes that have demonstrated weak governance and poor responses to internal security crises. In Mali, for example civilian-targeted violence surged by 38% in 2023, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). Similarly, in Niger, fatalities from rebel and militia attacks more than doubled, rising from 770 in 2022 to 1,599 in 2023 following the coup d’état. Burkina Faso is equally grappling with insecurity as it experienced its worst ever massacre in its history as an Islamist armed group massacred at least 133 people in the town of Barsalogho, in August 2024, highlighting the inadequacy of the government efforts to protect civilians.

China’s responses to the coups in the region have generally been defined by an exercise of restraint. Rather than condemning the coup leaders, the Chinese government usually opts for the generic communiques, calling for peaceful resolution of conflicts, the restoration of order. It is worth noting that in January 2022, China opposed African-supported United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Mali, arguing that the UN should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Member States. The absence of political or rights-based conditionalities in Chinese engagements removes leverage that other actors such as ECOWAS or even AU might use to incentivize good governance.

Unlike traditional Western development partners who tie aid and loans to reforms, free and fair elections or human rights benchmarks, China’s approach prioritizes state-to-state economic engagement without regard for internal governance. This has the effect of weakening the leverage of multilateral institutions like ECOWAS, which relies on collective pressure to compel regimes toward democratic restoration. When this pressure is undermined by alternative sources of unconditional support, regimes face fewer incentives to improve internal security or uphold civilian protection. China’s diplomatic and economic overtures toward sanctioned states, despite AU and ECOWAS resolutions condemning these regimes, further complicate regional stabilization efforts. By providing an alternative economic and political lifeline to military juntas, China risks contributing to fostering an environment that enables political instability and heightened insecurity. The concern is not that China is the root cause of violence in West Africa, but that its economic and diplomatic posture undermines regional mechanisms intended to deter unconstitutional changes of government and promote responsible governance. Over time, this erodes the normative foundations for peace and stability in the region.

ECOWAS’ Internal Struggles: A Crisis of Unity

It is important to avoid overemphasizing China’s role as the primary driver of regional destabilization. While external actors like China undeniably influence West Africa’s political and economic landscape, ECOWAS must also take responsibility for its internal shortcomings. ECOWAS’ inability to enforce collective norms is also rooted in internal fractures. 

During the 64th Ordinary Session of the Authority of the Heads of State and Government in December 2023, ECOWAS decided to review the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and strengthen it to include a prescription against unlimited presidential terms or term limit elongations, having regard to the damaging impact of term elongation on peace and security in the sub-region. The Authority of Heads of State and Government directed the Commission to intensify consultations with member states to finalize and present for adoption the draft Revised Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. However, adoption of the revised Supplementary Protocol has stalled due to the lack of political will on the part of some member states.

The contrasting political orientations of its member states, from democratic Ghana and Senegal to ‘autocratic’ Togo and now ex-member states and junta-led Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, limit consensus. In addition, the reliance on Nigeria as a political and financial anchor has led to uneven burden-sharing, creating resentment among smaller states and weakening collective resolve. The bloc’s inconsistent enforcement of democratic norms, the ambiguity surrounding its conflict mediation mechanisms especially in cases involving military coups versus constitutional coups and the competing interests of member states have all contributed to its current predicament.

Conclusion

As ECOWAS enters its sixth decade, it must adopt a strategic approach to external partnerships in order to strengthen and more effectively assert its agency. While China remains an indispensable ally to the region, the bloc must work towards ensuring that Chinese investments align with long-term security and governance objectives. Strengthening institutional frameworks to oversee foreign investments, enhancing transparency, and demanding adherence to governance norms should be central to ECOWAS’ engagement with China and other external partners. 

Furthermore, ECOWAS must reaffirm its role as a regional leader in governance and conflict resolution. The formation of the AES signals a pressing need for reassessment. To remain a credible force, ECOWAS must assert its authority in ensuring that economic partnerships, whether with China, Western States or other actors; reinforce, rather than undermine its foundational principles.

Fifty years since its inception, ECOWAS stands at a defining moment. China’s economic footprint in West Africa presents both immense opportunities and profound challenges. The direction the bloc takes in managing these engagements will determine whether it remains a passive beneficiary of external influence or emerges as a proactive architect of its own future. The golden jubilee is not just a milestone for reflection but a call to action for a more strategic, self-reliant and resilient ECOWAS in the years ahead.